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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Larry Eugene Morris appeals from the district court's summary dismissal 
of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Morris pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a 
plea agreement. State v. Morris, Unpublished Opinion No. 312, p. 1 (Ct. App. 
2013). The district court sentenced Morris to unified ten-year sentence with the 
first five years fixed. l!t. Morris filed a Rule 35 motion asking the court to 
suspend his sentence and place him on probation. l!t. The district court did not 
suspend Morris' sentence, but did reduce his sentence to four years fixed 
followed by six years indeterminate. l!t. at 1-2. Morris appealed, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and 
sentence. l!t. at 5. 
Morris then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 4-17.) 
In it he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations as 
they related to the sufficiency of the evidence, an alleged violation of the 
settlement offer by the state, and a claim of the involuntariness of his plea of 
guilty. (Id.) The state moved for summary dismissal of Morris' petition asserting 
Morris had failed to set forth sufficient evidence to support his petition as well as 
his failure to meet the 2-prongs of the Strickland test. (R., pp.44-52.) Morris, 
through counsel, filed a response to the state's motion for summary dismissal 
1 
asserting Morris had set forth sufficient evidence to support his claims as well as 
fulfilling the requirements of Strickland. (R. pp.81-93.) 
Following a hearing on the state's motion, the district court issued a 
written order granting summary dismissal of Morris' petition for post-conviction 
relief. (R., pp.105-131.) Morris timely appealed. 1 (R., pp.134-137.) 
1 Although counsel was originally appointed to represent Morris on this appeal 
(R., pp.144-145), the SAPD subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw 
from its representation of Morris based on the inability of three attorneys to 
identify "any meritorious issues for review" (4/2/13 Affidavit in Support of Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw and Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule). The 
motion to withdraw as counsel was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court, causing 
the SAPD to retain representation of Morris on appeal. (5/7/2013 Order). 
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ISSUES 
Morris states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Morris' 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Morris failed to show the district court erred in dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief where he failed to establish any prejudice as a result of 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Morris Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Where He Failed To Establish Any Prejudice 
As A Result Of His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Morris contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) Morris addresses 
only one claim originally asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief on 
appeal: that the district court erred in determining there was "no genuine issue 
of material fact as to [his] assertion that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
deficient performance" (Appellant's brief, p.9) for failing to "get the judge in the 
CPA case to unseal the documents in the CPA case for the purpose of Mr. 
Morris' sentencing hearing in the criminal case" (Appellant's brief, p.12). 
Because the district court correctly concluded Morris had failed to 
establish the prejudice prong of Strickland, Morris' argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
4 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief 
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The 
petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce 
admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl_ (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in 
the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. 
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. 
State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
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583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
D. Morris Fails To Make A Valid Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
Morris has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition for post-conviction 
relief, Morris asserted three claims. On appeal, Morris does not challenge the 
entirety of the district court's summary dismissal of his petition. Instead, he only 
addresses summary dismissal of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failing to persuade the sentencing court to unseal CPA documents to 
review for Morris' sentencing hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) Morris 
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contends the district court erred in dismissing his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because it failed to "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. 
Morris" when concluding Morris had not established any prejudice resulting from 
Morris' trial counsel's failure to have the trial court review said documents prior to 
sentencing. (Id.) 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated: 
Surmounting Strick/ands high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules 
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
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Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
Morris claims on appeal that had the sentencing court had the documents 
from his ongoing child protection case in front of it for review at his sentencing, 
the court would have realized how difficult it was for Morris to comply with the 
terms of his plea agreement to cooperate in drug buys for law enforcement 
without violating both the terms of said agreement and the requirements of his 
case plan to maintain custody rights of his daughter. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
14.) Morris claims he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to ensure 
these documents were made part of the sentencing court's record "because the 
sentencing court never fully understood the true nature of the conflict between 
the court orders in the CPA case and the obligations continued [sic] in terms of 
cooperation." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Morris asserts that the district court 
"would not have done the same thing as the sentencing court," and as such, 
"there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the question of whether Mr. Morris 
was prejudiced" by his trial court's failure to utilize the CPA records at his 
sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
Morris asserts the district court "found that trial counsel was deficient for 
his failure to get the judge in the CPA case to unseal the documents in the CPA 
case for the purpose of Mr. Morris' sentencing hearing in the criminal case." 
(Appellant's brief, p.12 (citation to the record omitted).) What the district court 
found was that Morris had "alleged a genuine issue of fact as to whether his 
counsel's performance in failing to present convincing argument for the court to 
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take judicial notice of the C.P.A. case document constituted defective 
performance." (R., p.122.) However, in granting the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Morris' petition for post-conviction relief, the court found "Morris 
ha[d] not alleged a genuine issue of fact that, if resolved in his favor, shows that 
he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to present convincing 
argument to the court for it to consider the C.P.A. case documents." (R., p.124.) 
The record supports this conclusion. 
As the district court found, the child protection case involving Morris' 
daughter did not exist at the time Morris entered into the plea agreement with the 
state. (R., p.121.) In fact, Morris' girlfriend was pregnant with the child at issue 
when she contacted law enforcement on Morris' behalf to offer his assistance as 
a confidential informant. (Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials (5/31 /13 
augmentation).) Morris entered a guilty plea and was released from jail (see, 
generally, 7/23/10 Tr.) on the same day he met with law enforcement and 
entered into a "Terms of Cooperation" with the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task 
Force to act as a confidential informant, accepting $500 from law enforcement 
for his "necessary living expenses" (Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials 
(5/31/13 augmentation)). The terms of Morris' plea, as placed on the record, 
were that the parties agreed to a five-year fixed sentenced followed by five years 
indeterminate, with the state's recommendation of whether said sentence should 
be imposed or suspended to be determined between the time of the entry of the 
plea and the sentencing itself, presumably to allow the state to obtain information 
from law enforcement regarding Morris' level of cooperation. (7/23/10 Tr., p.5, 
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L.20 - p.6, L.3.) The child at issue in the child protection case was born 
(Adjudicatory Report of the Guardian ad Litem (5/17 /13 augmentation).) 
Morris failed to maintain contact with law enforcement and in September, 
expressed his desire to "take [his] chances and just go to sentencing." 
(Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials (5/31/13 augmentation).) The case 
plan involving Morris was filed with the court on November, 5, 2010, but had a 
start date for the affected parties of October 22, 2010. (Order Regarding Case 
Plan (5/17/13 Augmentation).) Because of his failure to maintain contact with 
the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, Morris' service as a confidential 
informant was concluded on November 10, 2010. (Additional Plaintiff's 
Sentencing Materials (5/31/13 augmentation).) Morris was sentenced on 
November 29, 2010, at which time the state noted Morris had failed to comply 
the conditions of his performance as a confidential informant, thus releasing the 
state from the terms of the plea agreement which would have required a 
probation recommendation by the state. (11/29/10 Tr., p.10, L.1 - p.11, L.1.) 
At Morris' sentencing hearing, a case worker from the child protection 
case testified that Morris had made progress in a short period of time by being 
involved in extensive outpatient therapy, submitting clean urinalysis results, and 
"making incredible strides" to do for his family and comply with the case plan. 
(11/29/10 Tr., p.22, L.6 - p.23, L.21.) As the district court found in granting the 
state's motion to summarily dismiss Morris' petition for post-conviction relief, "the 
court was able to consider Morris's performance in the C.P.A. case, and could 
infer that Morris's desire to meet every condition of that program had hindered 
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his ability to cooperate with the task force." (R., p.124.) Morris asserts on 
appeal that without the actual child protection case plan before the sentencing 
court, the "true nature" of the conflict Morris was faced with could not be fully 
understood and thus prejudiced Morris. (Appellant's brief, p.15.) The district 
court erred, Morris claims, in inferring the sentencing court was able to determine 
"the full extent [of] the CPA case" on Morris' decision not to "adhere to the terms 
of cooperation" to be a confidential information pursuant to the agreement he 
had entered into with the state. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) Contrary to this 
position on appeal, Morris himself testified at sentencing as to just what the 
impact of the child protection case was on his decision not to live up to his 
agreement with the state when he advised the sentencing court he did not "follow 
the state asked to do with regarding stuff," because he did not want to work as a 
confidential informant because it "interfere[ed] with [his] family" and jeopardized 
his progress pursuant to the open child protection case. (11/29/10 Tr., p.28, L.8 
- p.29, L.5.) 
Morris later appeared before the sentencing court seeking leniency 
pursuant to Rule 35, armed with information of assistance he had provided to 
law enforcement on his own initiative after failing to comply with his confidential 
informant contract. (2/8/11 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.16, L.11.) The sentencing court at 
that time made it clear probation was never an option for Morris based on his 
record and the facts of the underlying case: 
I firmly believe that the sentence would have been a prison 
sentence. Mr. Morris's record, the facts leading up to the - Mr. 
Morris's possession of meth charge and conviction and the fact that 
he's a habitual offender means that probation was simply not in the 
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cards for Mr. Morris; it's not in the cards today. It would be 
diminishing his criminal history. It would be diminishing the crime. 
It would not act as appropriate punishment at all. It would not act 
as appropriate deterrence to Mr. Morris or to any other person. 
(2/8/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-20.) As the district court found in dismissing Morris' 
petition for post-conviction relief, "Morris would not have received a lesser 
sentence even if the court had considered the C.P.A. documents." (R., p.125.) 
As such, Morris had failed to "allege a genuine issue of fact as to whether he 
was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to present convincing argument to the 
court regarding consideration of the C.P.A. case documents." (Id.) The record 
supports this and thus supports the district court's summary dismissal of Morris' 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Morris' petition for post-conviction relief. 
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